Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the crossfire…

During much of the 25-year war in Sri Lanka, attention was focussed on the altercation between the majority Sinhalese and the largest minority Tamils. The views of the country’s Muslims, who constitute about 9 per cent of the population and see themselves as a separate racial group, have largely remained overlooked. Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political ambition are essential if there is to be a lasting peace resolution.

Atrocities of LTTE on Muslims
For centuries, the Muslim community has been scattered around Sri Lanka living in co-existence with the other two main ethnic communities (Sinhalese and Tamil) with very close socio-economic interactions among them. For years Muslim and Tamil children attended the same school but took different roles in cultural displays and sporting events. However as the ethnic crisis developed into armed conflict with Tamil youth taking to arms and the LTTE (Liberation of Tamil Tigers for Eelam) being formed, it became apparent that in the early eighties, in the east of Sri Lanka, there was a conflict of interest between Muslims and Tamils. Whilst this was initially at a manageable and political level, it slowly disintegrated in 1990 as the LTTE massacred worshippers in a mosque in Batticaloa and other attacks on Muslim civilians.

But before this, Muslims and Tamils had been traditionally included into local life as mutually supporting communities. There were Muslim traders, tailors, iron mongers, laborers and scholars. The Muslims in Jaffna had lived next to each other and therefore densely occupied a small part of this town. As part of the arena of culture and scholarship, Muslims formed an important part of the historic University of Jaffna. But when the development of districts took place in sixties and seventies, it hit the Muslims harder economically. A number of Muslim youth thus became convinced of Tamil militant ideology and joined the LTTE's military wing. In several Muslim villages and towns the LTTE opened its branch offices and was gradually gaining popularity amongst certain sections of the Muslim community. But soon this development received a setback when Tamil-Muslim riots broke out in April 1985, apparently over an incident in the town of Mannar in the north where three Muslim worshippers were said to have been gunned down by Tamil militants inside a mosque.

Following the above 1985 riots the LTTE changed its approach towards Muslims and unleashed some of its most ferocious acts of savagery on the innocent Muslims of Polonnaruwa in the Northeastern and Kattankudy and Eravur in the Eastern provinces. Tens and hundreds of Muslim men, women and children were massacred in their homes, fields, markets; the entire Muslim population of Jaffna in the north were evicted from their homes at gunpoint and turned into refugees overnight. They are still living in camps without any hope of returning to their places of birth. In short, the LTTE seems to have erroneously decided on a mission of ethnic cleansing in the Tamil districts. As a result of this mistaken strategy the LTTE lost all sympathy it had within the Muslim community and the animosity between the Tamils and the Muslims became widest.

Thus changing it all, on the 23rd of October 1990, Muslims were given an “expulsion ultimatum” merely 24hrs to exit from the so called ‘Tamil land’ by leaving all their possessions behind”. Armed LTTE cadres had gone round every village and handed over letters from their district leaders forcing the chief trustees /Imams/religious heads of all mosques to read out the letters over loud speakers. The letters ordered all the Muslims to vacate their respective villages within 48 hours and hand over all their belongings such as vehicles, radios, sewing machines, water pumps etc to LTTE cadres at a particular village school. They said the orders were from the LTTE high ranks and anyone trying to disobey shall be eliminated. After the deadline the armed cadres came round to push the Muslim residents out of their homes: men, women and children were herded through a narrow passage and, at the point of exit from the village they were bodily searched for ill-gotten gains. Metallic cutters were used to remove jewelleries that could not be easily removed, and each family was only allowed to take about 200 rupees (5 US dollars at that time). In some cases, the Muslims were not even allowed to change their clothing. All possessions of the Muslims were deemed by the LTTE to belong to Tamil Eelam.

The Muslims from other parts of the Northern Province (Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi) suffered the same fate as well. Approximately 95,000 men, women and children were expelled. (For details please refer to UTHRJ; Report 6, Chapter 3, andhttp://jaffnamuslims.lk) But this incident has been largely gone from the chronicles of the Sri Lankan conflict. Even the successive governments have failed to provide sufficient support to the displaced Muslims who find themselves in a political wilderness, without much of a voice, despite having representation in the government. Problems with education, proper shelter and sanitation plague the camps and so the displaced people were dependent on tedious jobs or handouts from generous donors or the government and charitable organizations.

Muslims didn’t agree with ceasefire of 2002
The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was dissatisfaction to many Muslims. They had no self-decisive representation at the peace talks, and many feared that any accord that gave the LTTE un-restricted control of the north and east, even in a centralized arrangement, would be critically damaging to their own welfare. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they continued to suffer brutal attacks. Since the recommencement of large-scale military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. Memories of LTTE cruelty are still fresh and bitter disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain compelling in the east. It is important to know that Muslims have never resorted to armed insurgency to assert their political position, although some have worked with the security forces, and few were members of early Tamil militant groups. But Muslims, mostly remained determined to peacefully channeling their annoyance through the political process by negotiating with the government and Tamil militants at different times. But there is no guarantee that this obligation to non-violence will be maintained, predominantly given the frustration visible among younger Muslims in the Eastern region. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be overstated, regularly for political ends. But there is a clear and present danger they will take on a role in inter-communal clashes if the conflict continues to infringe upon their safety.

Tamil Sinhalese also targeted Muslims
When Muslims were heaved upon miseries by the vindictive LTTE, the non-Tamil Sinhalese leaders too targeted the Muslims. During the period the Sinhalese leadership had been instrumental in instigating the Sinhalese masses to attack Muslim lives and property. The racial riot of 1915 was the first major episode in the Lankan history when Sinhalese animosity towards the Muslims was violently expressed. The most celebrated Sri Lankan Buddhist evangelist of that time, Anagarika Dharmapala, was a leading campaigner against Muslim presence in the country. He (just like any other RSS leader in India) termed Muslims as 'aliens' and 'foreigners' who according to him, deserved to be deported to Arabia. Although Dharmapala is long dead, but the echo of his views can still be heard during times of Sinhala-Muslim tension. Many among the Sinhalese Muslims believe that the Muslim domination in business in the country should be reversed. Both the spiritual and secular branches of the Sinhalese middle class share this view, and it cannot be denied that most of the communal violence against the Muslims has had economic overtones.

Sri Lankan Muslims not fundamentalists
Till date there is no interest among Sri Lankan Muslims in fundamentalist versions of Islam, although there have been some negligible violent clashes between orthodox and Sufi movements. But this hostility remained limited and most Muslims show considerable lenience to other sects and faiths. Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims channeling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes.

Almost all Muslim peace proposals remain dependent on the politics of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Whereas most of the times the government evades consultation with ethnic minorities (including the Muslims) and do not seem to include significant devolution of powers to local communities.

The war crimes
Apart from occasional ceasefires, from the 1980s through May 2009, the civil war raged across the country and the government along with the increasingly authoritative LTTE got engaged in widespread violence, often against defenseless civilians. Lankan forces are believed to be behind thousands of forced disappearances of Tamils (both Hindus and Muslims), mostly in the north and east. War crimes by both sides (the govt forces and the LTTE) in the last year of fighting may have contributed to as many as 40,000 Tamil civilian deaths. But it’s a big relief that the LTTE, the most dreaded terrorist outfit of south Asia, which took the life of our former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi, is now extinct in Sri Lanka. The organization which killed and maimed lives of thousands of Sinhalese and Tamil Muslims, spread terror across the island carried out suicide bombings and attacked civilian targets, especially in Colombo and the villages bordering the Tamil-speaking Muslims in the north and east of the island country. These “border villages” suffered enormously during the conflict. Some of the major LTTE incidents include the 1985 attack at the Sri Maha Bhodiya in Anuradhapura, where it murdered more than 100 Buddhist pilgrims, the 1996 suicide truck bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo in which over 70 people died, the 1998 suicide truck bombing at the Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, and the 2008 suicide bombing at the Colombo Fort railway station. The Tamil rebels also eliminated many political leaders, which include Sri Lankan deputy defence minister Ranjan Wijeratne in1991, President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993 and foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in 2005.

There is hardly any doubt that the LTTE was an evil organization whose leadership had no reservations about killing Sinhalese civilians or Tamil political opponents ( including the unfortunate Muslims) to serve its own political and personal ambitions. At the same time many Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad perceived that the LTTE was the only group that stood for them and presented their demands to the government and the majority Sinhalese population that had repeatedly targeted the Tamils. The complex 30-year relationship between the LTTE and the Tamil civilians cannot be judged by the government’s simple “with us or against us” paradigm, particularly after such a brutalizing and humiliating victory.

In the country's interest Sri Lanka continued their offensives against the LTTE, until the rebel group was literally wiped off. But the government is yet to pay any attention to the rights of the civilians. It was expected that The Sri Lankan government would set up camps, to provide shelter to thousands of innocent civilians fleeing the war zone. But it never happened. Post-conflict efforts to bring societies together are always burdened with difficulties, particularly in cases of deep racial division. In Sri Lanka the challenge is even greater, because the government denies that ethnicity was the driving factor behind the civil war. After all conflicts, issues of reconciliation and accountability arise. The Lankan government has tried to collapse the two and has said that both can be dealt with through domestic mechanisms. Reconciliation is a more forward-looking process of healing divisions between and within communities.

The way ahead for Sri Lanka
Although reestablishing of cordial relations after long periods of conflict never happens quickly. And in Sri Lanka there is a serious risk that it may not happen at all. The government’s intransigence and triumphalism a full two years after declaring victory over the LTTE has meant the country is yet to see any semblance of compromise or inclusiveness for both the Tamil Hindus and Tamil Muslims. To avoid an eventual return to violence, the government must change course drastically. The 30-year emergency needs to come to an end, and government repression of the media and political opponents must stop. Restoring the rule of law and accountability in the island is essential, as is a political settlement to provide real devolution of power. Attention must also be paid to the many victims of these three decades of war and political violence from all three main ethnic groups – Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. Indeed, rebuilding relations among those communities and getting to a point where each has some real understanding of what the others have gone through should be a central goal. All of this will take years, but the sooner the process starts it’s better for the country- the chances of resumption of another conflict will be less and less.

Summary of some of the identified Muslim civilians killed by LTTE -

26 Muslims were killed at Ottamawadi in December 1987
41 Muslims were killed at Karaitheevu in November 1987
35 Muslims were killed at Kinniya in April 1987
52 Muslims were killed at Mutur in October 1987
21 Muslims were killed at Sammanthurai Mosque in April 1989
67 Muslims were killed at Valaichchenai from April 1985 to July 2002
67 Muslims were killed at Kattankudy in December 1987
168 Muslims were killed at Kattankudy in July in 1990
147 Muslims were killed at Kattankudy Mosque in August 1990
58 Muslims were killed at Akkaraipattu in July 1990
14 Muslims were killed at Kattankudy Mosque in July 1990
13 Muslims were killed in November 1989
19 Muslims were killed at Alimnagar in August 1990
126 Muslims were killed at Eravur in August 1990
53 Muslims were killed at Ambalanthurai in August 1990
23 Muslims were killed at Sainthamaruthu in September 1992
15 Muslims were killed at Addalaichchenai in May 1990
?37 Muslims were killed at Pallitthidal, Akbarpuram in October1992
200 Muslims were killed at Kalmunai, Akkaraipattu and Pottuvil in June 1990
33 Muslims were killed at Ampara in August 1990
186 Muslims were killed by Police in June 1990
147 Muslims were killed at Alingippottanai in April 1992
30 Muslims were killed at Pottuvil in June 1991


http://twocircles.net/2012mar29/sri_lanka%E2%80%99s_muslims_caught_crossfire%E2%80%A6.html

http://malenadu.com/?p=7540

http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lankas-muslimscaught-in-the-crossfire/

http://kashmirmonitor.org/03312012-ND-sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-muslims-caught-in-the-crossfire-23746.aspx

http://epaper.kashmirmonitor.org/3132012/default.asp
http://epaper.kashmirmonitor.org/3132012/default.asp


http://urdu.chauthiduniya.com/2012/04/chakki-ke-do-paton-ke-darmiyan-piste-srilanka-ke-musalman

Why Muslim headcount in Indian Army necessary?

The Indian army is expected to remain a truly secular institution, without any prejudice or bias towards any religion, caste or creed. The Chiefs of this national army have come from different religious backgrounds. But interestingly, none came from the Muslim community. The [much-talked] Sachar Committee which was formed by the government to map the Muslim participation in different social and economic spheres in the country recommended the headcount of Muslims in different levels of the army some years ago. However, the idea of Muslim headcount in the army was strongly resisted by the then Army chief, General JJ Singh, who said that any such survey would dent the core of the institution. But there was no harm in getting the information as the government has the right to know the current status of Muslims in India. National security should be a top concern for the government. But to know how the community is faring in all terms of development must also be welcomed as it may help the government chalk out various schemes to improve the social status of the backward community.

But this hue and cry then did not remain confined to the army HQs only. In January 2006, L.K. Advani, then Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, walked out from the house obviously over the proposal of Muslim headcount in the army. But Why Mr. Advani & Company was so afraid by the idea of Muslim headcount in Indian Army? What was so offensive, secret or classified info hidden in it? There have been similar surveys in police and paramilitary forces in the country.

Why Muslim headcount in Army necessary?
In fact there are four important reasons which support the move of the Muslim headcount in the army.

1. The Sachar Committee was constituted to look into the representation of Muslims in various segments of private and public sector employment. So if it was seeking the details of Muslim employees in various levels, what was the fuss about this information in the armed forces?

2. Army already has region or community based regiments in place since British colonial days. The battle cries are based on religion and gods of different religions. Then why there was all this noise about Muslim headcount?

3. Muslims are underrepresented in the army. To rectify it we ought to take a headcount in the first step. This has already been done in the police and paramilitary. So why should army object to this?

4. And most importantly, the army chief is to serve the government as we have seen in the case of incumbent army chief, his valid grievance and the outcome so far, then why the then army chief questioned a decision of the government? And if, is it acceptable in a democracy?



Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India : Book by late Omar Khalidi investigated the religious composition of the armed forces, paramilitary and police.
Perhaps the reasons for keeping things such secretly wrapped are the substandard statistics of Muslims serving the army. While there is no official report, but the strength of Muslims is roughly around 2% and the figure comes around 29,000 in the million-strong Indian army, according to a news channel survey programme titled Minority Report. And If the number of Muslims serving in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) infantry that has over 50% Muslims and those in other wings not directly dealing with warfare are excluded, the proportion is definitely too low. So out of a Muslim population of nearly 20 crores, barely 29,000 Muslims were found suitable for Indian Army. Is it not pathetic!

Adding to the woes it’s equally regretful that there has not been a single Muslim Army Chief except Air Chief Marshal Idris Hasan Latif, PVSM who as the first Muslim Chief of Air Staff of the IAF was involved fully in the re-equipment and modernization plans of the air force. He convinced the government to approve the procurement of the Jaguar strike aircraft, a proposal which was lying dormant for over 8 years. He also held negotiations with the Russians and saw the induction of the MiG-23 and later, the MiG-25 aircraft into the IAF. And what could be more unfortunate than the incident that even Rasoolan Bibi, wife (widow) of Hawaldar Abdul Hameed- who was conferred the nation’s highest gallantry award Param Vir Chakra posthumously during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, literally had to beg President Pratibha Patil’s intervention to get her cataract operated in 2008.

History of Muslim under-representation in Indian army
But coming back to the real issue, the reason for the Muslim under-representation in the Indian army lies partly in history, and its public revelation must harm nobody. Whatever the exact percentage, a huge Muslim under-representation in our army is a fact. So is a huge Sikh over-representation. See the contrast. Sikhs form 1.86 per cent of India’s population but number around 8 per cent in the Indian army. While Muslims comprise about 18 per cent of India’s population but are 2 per cent in the army. Why is this truth about Muslim under-representation in the armed forces going censored? But an illogical love of confidentiality causes Indian rulers to hide information whose public admission would harm nobody. Just as Muslims are under-represented in the army, so are the Bengalis, Biharis, Oriyas, south Indians or Gujaratis. And just as Sikhs are over-represented, so are the Jats, Dogras, Garhwalis, Kumaonis, Gurkhas, Marathas and others. The Indian army’s recruitment pattern was set 150 years ago by India’s 1857 uprising. Shocked by the revolt, the British army adopted a recruitment strategy that punished the groups which rebelled against them and rewarded the ones that stayed trustworthy. Because Muslims of Awadh, Bihar and West Bengal led the uprising against the British, the British army stopped hiring soldiers from these areas. Also blacklisted from these places were high-caste Hindus whose regiments in Bengal were also mutineers. In disparity, the British raised the recruitment of castes that had stood by the British to put down the revolution and honored as martial races, they received preferential treatment in army recruitment for the following 90 years. Like any institution, the Indian army is a prisoner of the past.

Even today, the Indian Army favors enlisting men from the martial races. Their over-representation in the Indian army is enormous and figures bear this out. Of 2.87 lakh jawans hired by the army in between 2004 to 2006, a disproportionate 44,471 came from three “martial” states, Punjab, Haryana, and the mountain state of Uttaranchal. So these states which account for 5 per cent of India’s population provided 15 per cent of India’s army jawans.

In contrast, the fewest recruits came from “non-martial” West Bengal and Bihar. These two states account for 30 per cent of India’s population, but they provided only 14 per cent of army jawans in this three-year period. So the Indian army has not only a religion-based disparity in recruitment, but also one based on caste and region. A glimpse of this discrimination was provided by a press release issued by a defence office in Jammu ten years ago. Seeking recruits for the Indian army, the press release said: “No vacancies for Muslims and tradesmen.” Meaning that aggressive Dogras were welcome to apply, but not Hindu business castes like the Baniyas and the Khatris.

Why does India have separate regiments for the Sikhs, Jats, Dogras, Garhwalis, Kumaonis, Mahars, the Nagas, even the Gurkhas, but not a single regiment for the Muslims? This is tragic but it’s the truth which shouldn’t be suppressed. It should be recognized and dealt with. Muslim under-recruitment in the Indian army is an outcome of Partition. India and Pakistan’s antagonism is seen in both countries as Hindu versus Muslim terms, which is absolutely incorrect. But this chauvinism in itself discourages qualified Muslim youths from applying, which drives down Muslim numbers even more. Hence it’s quite right that the Muslims under-recruitment in the army strips the community of a good, life-long source of employment. It’s a sad situation which is not so easy to correct.

India’s armed forces are averse to hire Muslims as soldiers because they suspect the community’s loyalty to India. This discrimination is a natural outcome of the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan over 60 years. In similar situations, the same thing happens all over the world. The Israeli army doesn’t trust its Arab soldiers in jobs related to defence security. The Buddhist Sinhalese army under-recruits its Hindu Tamils for fear that their sympathies could lie with the Tamil Tigers. And After 9/11, US army recruiters would probably screen a Muslim American volunteer more thoroughly than a Christian American.

Composition of Indian Army
This under-representation of Muslims and other caste or regional groups benefits the over-represented ones. The composition of the Indian army is totally awry numbers-wise. West Bengal’s population is eight times that of Uttaranchal. But Uttaranchal provided almost the same number of army recruits as West Bengal almost every year. Compare a “martial” Punjab with a non-martial Gujarat. Punjab’s population is half that of Gujarat. But it provided four times as many people to the Indian army as Gujarat. The Indian army hired far more recruits in Rajasthan than in Tamil Nadu though Tamil Nadu’s population is higher. So basically, the Indian army is subjugated numbers-wise by Sikhs and Hindi-speaking Hindus of north India. This imperfect current status quo must go. Why Muslims are expected to wear patriotism on their sleeves and there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve or distrust people of this community. Muslims are as much Indian as any other in this country and have always stood firmly on the forefront whenever there’s a call of duty for the country. A few untoward stray incidents must not stand in account for the test of loyalty always, as because going by such biased benchmark it may initiate an awful precedent. As many such incidents had offenders, perpetrators who were not from the minority community.

This unwritten divisive law of mistrust and bias must go. But none of it will end until we help make these things end by taking some proactive steps. This current state of mind and pertinent approach will only lead to more divergence and separation between the largest minority (Muslims) and the ruling majority (Hindus). And the entire country will be perpetually distrustful, forever looking over our shoulders and living a life in fear, that fear framed by metal detectors, security cameras, and sharp glances at people who appear to be with grown beard and a skull cap. Hence in the end following the chart below will enlighten the vocabulary of the people who presume Muslims as alien or anti Indians.

Muslim soldiers who made India and community proud
The following chart divulges the names of some who made not only the community but the country proud:

Param Vir Chakra
Company Havildar Major Abdul Hamid, (4 Grenadiers)

Maha Vir Chakra
Mohammed Ismail: 1947-48 Operation
Brig. Mohammed Usman: Indo-Pakistan War

Kirti Chakra
2007: Mohd. Shan Ahmed (posthumous) was posted as Cash Overseer at post office Jhansi. On 26 December, 2005, resisted looting of cash and in the attempt succumbed to fatal injuries inflicted by armed miscreants. He belonged to Jhansi (UP).

2009:
Lance Havildar Aziz Mohd: 20 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (Posthumous)
Sapper/Operator Executive Machinery Budhu Khan (Posthumous) Naik Mohd Sadiq

2008:
Rifleman Abdul Hamid Chara: 162 Infantry Battalion TA (H&H)JAK LI/18 Rashtriya Rifles(posthumous)

2007:
Rifleman Raiece Ahmad Ganaie: Jammy & Kashmir Light Infantry/50 Rashtriya Rifles

2006:
Havildar Mohammad Maroof: 23 Rajput Regiment,
Havildar Abrahim: Jammu And Kashmir Light Infantry/47 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Riyaz Ahmad Bhat: Assam Regiment/35 Rashtriya Rifles

Sena Medal (gallantry)

2009:
Havildar Ilyas Ali: 32 Assam Rifles
Lance Naik Javaid Ahmad Wani: Jamm and Kashmir Light Infantry// 44 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Mohamad Hadish: 24 Assam Rifles (Posthumous)

2008:
Subedar Mohd Rashid: Jammu and Kashmir Rifles/28 Rashtriya Rifles
Naik Mohammed Amin Bhat: Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry/62 Rashtriya Rifles
Sepoy Abdul Hamid: 153 Infantry Battalion (TA) Dogra
Sepoy Abdul Hamid: 156 Inf Bn TA (H&H) Punjab/58 Rashtriya Rifles
Sepoy Qumer-ud-din Beg: 156 Inf Bn TA (H&H) Punjab/58 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Ishtiaq Ahmed: Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry/18 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Mehmood Ahmed Itoo: Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry/33 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Mohd Yousaf Lone: 161 Infantry Battalion TA (H&H) JAK LI
Rifleman Mazafar Iqbal: 14 Assam Rifles

2007:
Captain Anas Ahmad: 19 Kumaon Regiment
Lance Naik Mehmood Shah: 3 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry
Sepoy Mohd Sharief: 159 Infantry Batallion (TA)(H&G) Dogra, 23 Rashtriya Rifles
Sepoy Jabir Khan: Mechanised Infantry/9 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Gohar Ali Khan: Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry/19 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Mohammad Sayed Mantoo: Jammu & Kashmir Fiels/18 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Abdul Rahim Dar: 162 Infantry Battalion (TA) JAK LI/14 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Nazir Ahmad Wani: 162 Infantry Battalion (TA) JAK LI/14 Rashtriya Rifles
Rifleman Md Ibrahim Khan: 33 Assam Rifles

2006:
Company Havildar Major Mohammad Ashraf Sheikh: 22 Maratha Light Infantry.
Lance Naik Farooq Ahmad Rather: 20 Jammu And Kashmir Rifles

Param Vishisht Seva Medal
The Param Vishsish Seva Medal is awarded to recognize "distinguished service of the most exceptional order" to all ranks of the armed forces. In practice, however, the award tends to be granted only to the most senior officers of the various branches of the Indian military. The award may be granted posthumously and subsequent awards are represented by a bar worn on the ribbon. The award carries with it the right to use "P.V.S.M." as post nominal letters.

2008:
Lieutenant General Zameer uddin Shah, SM, VSM: Regiment of Artillery(General Cadre)
Ati Vishisht Seva Medal

2009:
Major General Syed Ata Hasnain, SM, VSM: Infantry: HQ 19 Infantry Division

Vishisht Seva Medal

2009:
Air Commodore Naseem Akhtar: Flying (Pilot)

2008:
Group Captain Zia Ahmad Rizvi: Logistics

Sena Medal

2009:
Brigadier Khurshid Maneck Balsara: Naga Regiment
Brigadier Pattiarimal Mohamadali Hariz, VSM: Mechanised Infantry/ HQ 91 Infantry Brigade

2008:
Colonel Steve Muzaffar Ismail: 2/1 Gorkha Rifles
Subedar Mohd Ilyas: 3, Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry Regimental Centre

Vayu Sena Medal (gallantry)

2009:
JWO Jawed Hussain Siddiqi, Flt Eng

2009:
Rakshak:
Lance/Naik Abdul Rashid Khan: Territorial Army, 5 Rashtriya Rifles
Rhino:
Captain Mudassar Iqbal: 2 Bihar


http://twocircles.net/2012mar13/when_will_indian_armed_forces_do_justice_muslims.html